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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion thereof.14 In the Matter of Brogan'r5 it was held that a defen-
dant in a Nevada divorce action was precluded from impeaching the
validity of the decree in order to assert a claim under New York's
Decedent Estate Law § 18 because of his subsequent remarriage.
The Court, however, reaffirmed that all the Williams case did was to
remove from the question of "full faith and credit" the subsidiary
question of fault. McCarty v. McCarty,16 following this, avers that
plaintiff can challenge validity of defendant's decree despite the fact
that the court found that he abandoned her without reasonable cause.
The judgment of a sister state must be given full faith and credit but
the findings, are not conclusive when domicile was fraudulent and
ineffectual to confer jurisdiction.
H. C. W.
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF GOODS-CONTRACT FRUSTRATED BY WAR
-TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION-REcOVERY OF MONEY PRE-
VIOUSLY PAID.-Appellant company was incorporated in Poland and
had its head and seat at Wilno. The defendant was registered and
carried on business in the United Kingdom. By a c.i.f. contract in
writing dated July 12, 1939, defendant agreed to sell and plaintiff to
purchase certain machinery for £4,800, of which L1,000 was in fact
paid. Delivery was to be three or four months from settlement of
final details at Gdynia in Poland, and the place of erection of the
machinery, though unmentioned in the contract, was agreed to be in
Wilno. The contract contained a clause to the effect that, "in the
event of war, a reasonable extension of time shall be granted". On
September 1, 1939, war broke out between Poland and Germany and
on September 3, 1939, Great Britain declared war on Germany.
About September 23, 1939, Gdynia was occupied by the enemy. Re-
spondents did not deliver the machinery and appellants claim the
return of the £1,000 paid on account. Tucker, J., dismissed the
action, and the Court of Appeal affirmed his decision. In view of
the fact that all Poland was then occupied by the enemy, appellants ob-
tained from the Board of Trade a license to proceed with the appeal.
Held, that the clause, providing for a "reasonable extension of time"
in event of war, could not prevent frustration of the contract by the
24 Cf. Matter of Brogan, 265 App. Div. 463 (2d Dep't), aff'g, 178 Misc.
801 (1943) ; Oberlander v. Oberlander, 179 Misc. 459 (1943) ; Reese v. Reese,
Queens Co. Sup. Ct, N. Y. L. J., March 13, 1943, p. 999; McCarty v. McCarty,
Kings Co. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 28, 1943, p. 478; Baker v. Baker, N. Y.
Co. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 24, 1943, p. 740; Jiranek v. Jiranek, Westchester
Co. Sup. Ct, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 28, 1943, p. 385
15 Cited supra note 14, 265 App. Div. 463 (2d Dep't), aff'g, 178 Misc. 801
(1943).
'1 Cited supra note 14, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 28, 1943, p. 478.
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war, on the ground that it had made express provision for that con-
tingency. The war involved an indefinite interruption of perform-
ance, causing a total failure of the consideration bargained for. A
party, who has paid money under a contract, may recover it should
there be such a failure of consideration, not because of any provision
of the contract, but because the law gives a remedy in quasi-contract
to any party who has not received that for which he contracted.
Therefore, appellants could recover the £1,000. Chandler v. Webster
was overruled. Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe
Barbour, Ltd., [1943] W. N. 177; Appeal from Court of Appeal
[1942] 1 K. B. 12, [1941] W. N. 122.
In Chandler v. Webster,' the House of Lords stated that, al-
though there was frustration of the object and thus failure of con-
sideration, it would not write a new contract for the parties by imply-
ing any conditions which were foreseeable when the contract was made.
The court distinguished the case from that of Taylor v. Caldwell,2
pointing out that a contract for the sale of a particular thing must not
be construed as a positive contract, but as subject to an implied con-
dition that, when the time comes for fulfillment, the specified thing
continues to exist.3 Whereas in the Taylor case the premises which
were the very subject of the lease were destroyed prior to'time of
performance, in the Chandler case the leased premises were available.
Defendant, in the Chandler case, had not contracted to provide a
coronation procession, nor could the holding of said procession be
implied as a condition, since plaintiff contracted to pay in advance of
the scheduled date for the procession. While New York has followed
the law laid down by Chandler v. Webster,4 it has recognized the
doctrine that frustration of the object of the contract excuses further
performance, and has refused to enforce a contract on the theory that
the mutually contemplated object having failed, plaintiff could not
exact payment.5
2 Contra: Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K. B. 493. Defendant agreed to
let to plaintiff a room for the purpose of viewing a coronotion procession, which
subsequently became impossible, owing tJ the illness of the King. The court
held that plaintiff lessee was not entitled to recover the £100 which he had
paid; and defendant lessor was entitled to payment of the balance, for which
he counterclaimed, inasmuch as his right to that payment had accrued before
the procession became impossible.
2 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & Smith 826 (1863). Defendant had agreed
to let plaintiff have the use of a music hall for the purpose of having concerts
upon certain specified days. Before performance of the contract, the hall was
destroyed by fire. Plaintiff was excused from taking the garden and paying
the money, and defendant from performing its promise to give the use of the
hall and gardens and other things.
3 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K. B. 754; cf. principal case. But see note 1
srupra.
4 Forty-fifth St. Realty Co. v. 17-19 W. 45th St. Corp., 142 Misc. 310,
254 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1931).
5 Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484,
156 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1915). This case must be differentiated from the
Chandler case for, in the latter, defendant's rights had vested before the day
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It is difficult to see why the House of Lords overruled Chandler
v. Webster, since that case involved the theory of frustration of object,
whereas the instant case was decided rather on that of impossibility
of performance. 6 At one time, in order to protect the integrity of
contracts, the harsh rule prevailed that a promisor is not excused from
performance under any circumstances unless he has shielded himself
by an express condition. 7  This harsh rule has gradually been re-
laxed, in the interests of justice, and the courts now recognize several
exceptions to the rule that impossibility of performance is no excuse.
8
However, frustration of the object of a contract, literally, does not
mean impossibility of performance. 9 If a party to a contract has
paid money and the other party has wholly failed to perform on his
part, restitution may be had both in England' 0 and the United States."
The rule is that one who has paid for goods which he never gets is
entitled to recover the payment, even though the reason why per-
formance is not made by the seller is excusable impossibility, for the
reason that there has been a total failure of consideration.12 How-
ever, where performance is still possible, although the expected value
of the performance is destroyed, the contract does not become void
ab initio so as to undo all that has been done under it.' s The parties
are merely excused from further performance, but the contract is
the procession was to take place; in the former, plaintiff's rights were to vest
upon publication and delivery of the books-publication taking place after the
calling off of the race was not the publication contemplated by the contract.
6 Since a "reasonable extension of time" could not be determined because
of the prolonged nature of the war, performance of the contract was impossible.
Furthermore, shipment by defendant at the time Gdynia was in German hands
would have been illegal under the doctrine of Trading with the Enemy (see
Baily v. De Crespigiy, L. IL 4 Q. B. 180 [1869], holding that where the law
forbids or prevents performance of a promise, legal when made, the promisor
is freed from liability; performance of such a promise is illegal as well as
impossible).
7 Wheeler v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 543 (1880).8 North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 U. S. 12, 37 Sup. Ct.
490, 61 L. ed. 960 (1917); International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 App.
Div. 180, 146 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1914) ; Gesualdi v. Personeni, 128 N. Y. Supp.
683 (1911) ; Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667 (1891) ; Baily v.
De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180 (1869), cited supra note 6.
9 "Where performance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of
the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized
as such by both parties for entering into the contract, has been destroyed by an
unforeseen event, this operates as failure of consideration in substance for the
promise of the other party, because such performance has lost its value. The
name 'frustration' has been given to this situation." (3 WILLisTrO, CoDNAcTs§ 1935.)
"Giles v. Edwards, 7 T. R. 181 (1797).
"Martin v. Cunningham, 231 Mass. 280, 121 N. E. 21 (1918) ; Brokaw v.
Duffy, 165 N. Y. 391, 59 N. E. 196 (1901).
12 Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291 (1853).
"3 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & Smith 826 (1863), cited supra note 2.
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enforceable with respect to things done and rights accrued up to the
time that fulfillment of the object of the contract became impossible.14
A.J.
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS-APPEAL AND ERROR-CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw.-The Securities Exchange Commission brings certiorari
to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia,' reversing an order made by the Commission
approving a plan of reorganization for the Federal Water Service
Corporation. The directors and officers of the Federal Water Ser-
vice Corporation (hereafter called Federal), a holding company reg-
istered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,2 pur-
chased preferred stock of the company during a period in which the
management of the company, which they controlled, proposed to the
Commission successive plans of reorganization pursuant to the Act.3
The respondents controlled Federal through their control of its par-
ent, Utility Operators Company, which owned all of the outstanding
shares of Federal's Class B common stock, representing the control-
ling voting power in the company. Prior to this plan, three other
plans for reorganization were submitted by Federal which provided
for participation by Class B stockholders in the equity oi the proposed
reorganized company. This feature of the plans was unacceptable
to the Commission, and all were ultimately withdrawn. The present
plan proposing a merger contemplated the elimination of Class B stock
and the conversion of the preferred stocks and Class A stock into a
new common stock with a par value, the effect of which was to reduce
materially the capital of the corporation. The Commission declined
to approve the plan on the ground that the plan permitted the pre-
ferred stock purchased by respondents to participate in the reorgan-
ization on a parity with all other preferred stock. Thereafter, the
plan was amended to provide that the preferred stock, so purchased,
unlike other preferred stock, would not be converted into stock of the
reorganized company, but might be surrendered to the reorganized
24 Economy v. S. B. & L. Bldg. Corp., 138 Misc. 296, 245 N. Y. Supp. 352
(1930); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484,
156 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1915), cited supra note 5.
1128 F. (2d) 303, 75 U. S. 374 (App. D. C. 1942), wherein order of
Commission was reversed and remanded on the ground that the Commission
acted on a vital question of policy which Congress would have to act first by
changing the standard it has expressed in the Act. Thus, the Commission ex-
ceeded its statutory authority. There was at the time no regulation of the
Commission, no provision of the Statute, and no rule of common law or equity
prohibiting the purchase of stock by an officer or director of a corporation
during the pendency of reorganization proceedings.
2 C. 687, 49 STAT. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 et seq.
3 PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING ComPANY ACT OF 1935, §§ 7 and 11.
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